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In this  article,  we  explore  the  process  of economic  change  following  the  NGO-led  implementation  of  a
small-scale  off-grid  hydropower  system  in  Tanzania.  We  examine  how  the  implementing  actor  deals  with
economic  challenges  and  local  ownership  in  order  to achieve  sustainable  electricity  supply.  The  qualitative
case  study  shows  that  the  NGO,  ACRA-CCS,  has  overcome  a number  of  constraints,  which  are  sometimes
associated  with  donor  funding.  This  has been  achieved  by  having  multiple  donors,  an  integrated  approach
and  a longer  presence.  The  ‘logic’  of implementation  included  active  enhancement  of productive  electric-
ity  use,  community  services  and  beneﬁts.  As a result  of these  actions,  the customer  base  grew  quickly,
rather  than it  taking  many  years  to develop.  The case  illustrates  the  process  whereby  an  off-grid  system
becomes  economically  viable.  Local  ownership  has led  to  the  project  becoming  an  arena  for communityociotechnical systems
frica
collaboration  and  problem  solving,  and  creating  values  such  as effective  load  management  and  protec-
tion  of  infrastructure.  We  suggest  that  attention  should  be  given  to  possible  public  private  community
partnerships  (PPCPs)  – involving  communities  as crucial  partners.  The  choice  of  a socio-technical  system
perspective  was  fruitful  and  provided  crucial  insights  into  how  different  factors  manifested,  interacted
and  played  out  in  practice.
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. Introduction
In this article, we are concerned with access to electricity for
oor people in East Africa and speciﬁcally study a case of rural
lectriﬁcation using off-grid mini-hydropower in Tanzania. The
ydropower system of 300 kilowatts (kW) was built by an Ital-
an non-governmental organization (NGO) in partnership with the
ocal church and funded by international and national donors. Since
010, the system has been supplying electricity to customers. The
im of the project was to provide access to electricity and thereby
ontribute to social and economic development of the area.
Electricity is a powerful resource that has the potential to cat-
lyze societal change by providing opportunities for a new range
f activities and services. However, previous research shows that
uch positive outcomes – such as social and economic development
esulting in improved quality of life and improved livelihoods for
ural populations – do not always result. In fact, many rural elec-
riﬁcation initiatives do not produce the sought-for development
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +46 31 7723105.
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utcomes and even fail to deliver electricity services over the
xpected system lifetime [1,2]. This is commonly attributed to the
ay in which the electriﬁcation initiatives interplay with existing
ocal conditions and especially how developers and implementers
andle the challenges associated with implementing reforms in
grarian, seasonal economies where people generally have low
ncomes.
We  focus our discussion on a few aspects that previous research
ighlight as prerequisites for sustainable small-scale energy sys-
ems in poor rural areas: achieving economic viability, a high
egree of local participation and development of local exper-
ise [2–6]. The most important overall factors that make these
oals hard to achieve are rural poverty and poorly developed
ural economies and markets. These factors result in low demand
or electricity services, slow development of economically pro-
uctive electricity use and a weak customer base [7–10]. For
rivate and commercial entities, economic viability includes recov-
ring investment costs, and making a proﬁt. For donor-funded,
on-commercial initiatives, cost recovery is not necessary, and
conomic viability is deﬁned as covering the costs of operation,
aintenance and, in this case, future reinvestments. However,
evelopment aid – in many areas, not only electricity – has been
riticized for not resulting in economically viable installations or
der the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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elf-sustaining organizations. According to this critique, develop-
ent aid maintains structures of economic and organizational
ependence on external actors [11].
In contrast, NGOs are often considered champions of local par-
icipation and empowerment. The NGO that is the focus of this
rticle is no exception; the project has been ambitious in involv-
ng local communities and building local competences. The project
as also included complementary investments and cross-sector
oordination, other features identiﬁed by scholars as important for
uccess [12]. Therefore, the case we study here displays what liter-
ture has identiﬁed as both negative determining factors – donor
ependency and working in a poor area – and positive determining
actors – a strong emphasis on local ownership, capacity build-
ng and complementary investments. What will this mean for the
ustainability of the project and its impact on the local economy?
Our aim is to explore the process whereby a donor-funded off-
rid electriﬁcation project using renewable energy, implemented
y an international NGO, translates into an organizationally and
conomically viable local utility, and a growing local economy.
he case is of general interest because it provides insights for the
evelopment of mini-grids based on hydropower or other renew-
ble energy sources in poor rural areas all over Africa, the subject
f this Special Issue, as well as for other parts of the world with
imilar energy needs (see also Eder, Mutsaerts and Sriwannawit
13], and Hancock in this special issue [14]). It is also of wider
nterest as decentralized electriﬁcation in African countries is often
arried out by non-governmental entities [6,15] and non-proﬁt
ntities and community-based organizations are likely to play an
mportant role in future development of renewable energy systems
 sometimes in partnership with commercial actors or as social
ntrepreneurs.
Scientiﬁcally, we contribute to existing knowledge by providing
 rich description of how and why various factors come to matter. A
heoretical and empirical contribution of the article lies in its inves-
igation and analysis of system dynamics. Electriﬁcation processes
re unique and play out differently in each place, but the system
nderstanding guides us to what is likely to be important, what
o look for and what questions to ask. The study ﬁts well into the
mbition of Energy Research & Social Science to investigate the social
ystem surrounding energy technology and hardware. It engages
ith some of the research questions and areas highlighted in the
rst issue of this new journal, in the articles by Sovacool [16], Stern
17] and Stirling [18]: it applies human-centered research methods
nd ﬁeld work in an exploratory study of human–energy interac-
ions. The electriﬁcation process is viewed from the perspective of
ultiple actors, including citizens in their roles as users, customers,
nd members of the local utility.
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we  explain the
heoretical perspective and the focus of the case study, and sum-
arize key points from earlier research. Section 3 gives a brief
escription of the project and of the area and the economy in which
he project was implemented. Based on this, the aim of this paper
s speciﬁed into concrete research questions directing the analysis
Section 4). A method section follows (Section 5), before the case
tudy results are presented and discussed (Section 6). Finally we
um up the ﬁndings and relate them to theory and earlier research
Section 7).
. Theoretical perspective and previous research.1. A socio-technical approach to electriﬁcation
This paper argues that our understanding of system dynamics in
ural electriﬁcation is greatly enhanced by taking the literature on
t
u
m
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ocio-technical systems seriously. This literature contributes a per-
pective that sees technological and societal change as interrelated
19]. Socio-technical approaches highlight co-evolution of tech-
ology and society, the multi-dimensionality and complexity of
echnological change, and multi-actor processes [20]. Researchers
ave applied socio-technical approaches in analyses of large-scale
nfrastructure development and the development of new renew-
ble energy technologies, mainly within industrialized countries
20–22]. As yet, few studies apply this perspective to small-scale
nergy systems in East Africa ([23,24], see also Ulsrud, Winther,
alit and Rohracher in this special issue [25]).
We theorize electriﬁcation as a dynamic process of formation
f a new socio-technical system, which brings people, technology,
nstitutions and resources into speciﬁc relationships (see Fig. 1 for
he theoretical conceptualization). In small-scale hydropower sys-
ems, actors, institutions and networks form around the concrete
ystem of energy production and distribution. Networks connect
ocal actors to one another as well as to district, national and inter-
ational stakeholders, thereby providing important support. The
ystem is shaped by and shapes its environment, with dynamic
nd emerging outcomes. As the system develops over time, the
elationships produce outcomes that transform the dynamics as
ell as the system design in itself.
Scholars in the ﬁeld of socio-technical systems pay close atten-
ion to the role of technology [26] and how technical systems come
ith speciﬁc demands, possibilities and restrictions, that condi-
ion development. They acknowledge the importance of actors and
uman perceptions as well as relations of power – although the
onsideration of power relations is still an emerging issue in the
eld [20]. In our analysis, we focus mainly on the implementing
GO, the local utility, and local users. The implementing actor plays
 key role and works according to a certain ‘logic’, namely: (1) the
GO’s ethics and objectives, (2) its choice of system design and
ode of operation, and (3) the strategies for implementation and
ystem sustainability. Our focus is on how the NGO handles the
conomic challenges (related to rural poverty and the need for eco-
omic viability) and the challenges of building from scratch a local
rganization to independently own  and manage the system, after
he NGO exits. We  analyze how the relationships develop over time
etween the NGO, the local utility and people in the communities.
.2. Existing critique of NGO-led development
To enhance our understanding of the implications of the ‘logic’
y which electricity is introduced, this article also departs from
he scholarly discussion on NGO-led development and the vices
nd virtues of the aid industry in general [27–29]. NGOs have often
een conceptualized as a grassroots alternative to supposedly cor-
upt and inefﬁcient government agencies, and their involvement
as been held to safeguard a participatory, bottom-up approach
o development and social improvement [30,31]. Yet although ini-
ially welcomed by policy-makers and academics alike, NGO-led
evelopment has in more recent times come under closer and more
ritical scrutiny [32,33].
One important critique directed toward NGO-led development
n recent years is related to NGOs’ dependency on donors. The
iterature argues that this dependence risks placing NGOs in a
atron–client relationship with donors, where the activities and
nterventions are more or less donor driven. Scholars also raise seri-
us questions about whether the NGOs are primarily accountable
o the donors or to the targeted communities [34]. It is also argued
hat this might divert resources into tangible and visible projects
ndertaken to please potential contributors, at the expense of
ore complex and long-term processes with potentially higher,
ut less easily measured, impacts [35–37]. According to this logic,
22 H. Ahlborg, M. Sjöstedt / Energy Research & Social Science 5 (2015) 20–33
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ACRA-CCS aimed “to maximize the beneﬁts of access to energy and
sustainability of the service” [44]. The NGO adopted a “participatory
and integrated approach for the purpose of providing sustainable
1 According to common deﬁnitions, pico-hydropower systems have power out-
puts below 10 kW,  micro-hydro 10–100 kW and mini-hydro 100–1000 kW in power
output [42,43].ig. 1. Conceptual understanding of small-scale rural electriﬁcation from a socio-t
echnical system and energy source. The system develops in relation to and constra
ircle).
GOs may  risk becoming technical transfer agents, overemphasiz-
ng short-term quantitative outputs over qualitative impact [38].
owever, the literature also argues that if an NGO has the ability
o sustain a broader funding base, some of these pressures can be
itigated [33].
The debate over the role of NGOs in development also speaks
o a general debate on issues of ownership and results-based
anagement. While ownership by states over their national devel-
pment agendas is being widely promoted within the new global
id architecture, there are growing concerns that foreign actors
till determine much of the development agenda. That is, the
mphasis on ownership has in some instances been shown to be
ifﬁcult to combine with donor priorities, especially since donors
ace increasingly strict demands from their own  governments or
unders [39].
The discussion on ownership also relates to the local level. Many
GOs have almost exclusively become service providers rather
han facilitators of collective action and empowerment, which
ome observers argue is inconsistent with the operation of organi-
ations claiming to promote qualitative change [40]. Some scholars
rgue that whether or not a project is able to deliver on its promises
epends crucially on the ability of NGOs to foster true local owner-
hip and capacity [31]. A perhaps more fundamental critique of
ow NGOs ‘do’ development regards the widespread use of ‘par-
icipatory approaches’. These are seen by some observers to be a
echnology of ‘developmental rule’ that creates a space of exception
utside the normal arena of politics – and depoliticizes problems
nto something needing a technical solution [41].
Taken together, non-proﬁt actors such as NGOs are considered
mportant actors for small-scale off-grid electriﬁcation in areas
utside coverage of the national grid. But electriﬁcation initia-
ives face important challenges relating to economic viability and
ocal ownership. According to the theoretical starting points of this
tudy, in order to understand outcomes for the system as such and
or the community, we must map  the system components and ana-
yze the dynamic interplay between the logic of implementation
nd the context.
p
r
dcal perspective. A new socio-technical system (the inner circle) forms around the
y the local context (the circle in the middle) and higher societal levels (the largest
. Rural electriﬁcation in Ludewa District, Tanzania
Tanzania’s Southern Highlands has a temperate climate and
ydrological conditions suitable for the development of small-
cale hydropower systems. There are many non-proﬁt hydropower
nstallations, in areas where the national grid does not reach,
wned and operated by local churches or community orga-
izations. There are also some pico-hydropower1 installations
eveloped by local entrepreneurs. The initiative to build a mini-
ydropower system in the Kisongo river basin in Ludewa District
ame from the local church, to the diocese in the neighboring region
f Njombe, Tanzania. The diocese contacted the Italy-based inter-
ational development cooperation organization ACRA-CCS (at the
ime ACRA–Cooperazione Rurale in Africa e America Latina) and
sked them to help ﬁnd funding and carry out the implementation.2
he organization is active in 16 countries, has around 275 staff and
n 2013, the total budget spent on projects in the areas of envi-
onment, water, food, education, health and economy, was over
.5 million Euros. In 2006, with funding from the Italian govern-
ent and citizens, ACRA-CCS started to implement the ﬁrst phase
f the ‘Mawengi Integrated Rural Development Program’, in collab-
ration with the Catholic Church and local government. They built
 so-called run-of-the-river system3 of 300 kW,  and a mini-grid
upplying electricity to nearby villages.
Formulating the objectives of its intervention in Mawengi,2 In 2013, ACRA partners with CCS (Centro Cooperazione Sviluppo).
3 A run-of-the-river system has none or little water storage. The system diverts
art of the river ﬂow into the hydropower system, but does not alter the normal
iver course. After passing into the penstock and through the turbine, the water is
irected back into the river downstream.
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This empirical section provides a rich description of the
Mawengi electriﬁcation process, in relation to the research ques-
tions posed. Section 6.1 answers research question 1 on the type ofH. Ahlborg, M. Sjöstedt / Energy Re
ccess to energy for 20,000 people in the district of Ludewa” and
avoring “the socio-economic development of the rural communi-
ies of the basin of the river Kisongo” [44].
The national electric grid does not reach the area in which the
roject was carried out. Like most rural areas of Tanzania, this area
as a seasonal economy; communities depend on the agricultural
ycles of planting, cultivation and harvest, following the patterns
f rainfall. The analysis here draws on a baseline study on local
ivelihoods done by ACRA-CCS (2012), and original data on the local
conomy.
In this particular area, maize and beans are the most important
rops. Some households also grow wheat, coffee, and a variety of
egetables and fruits. Most households (72% in 2012) keep livestock
or self-consumption. Nearly all families (99%) grow maize for self-
onsumption and the rest is sold. During the months after harvest,
eople pay school fees and make investments. Money is set aside
o buy agricultural inputs for the following planting season. Extra
oney is invested in domestic animals, land or tree planting. Many
ouseholds in the area have no economic buffer. In time of crisis,
amilies sell animals, timber or land, or travel to town for temporary
mployment to cope with economic stress. From observation and
nformal discussion, it appears that very few people are undernour-
shed. But, as in many other areas, many people die from diseases
nd in road accidents, and a lot of families have lost members of
roductive age. Currently, Njombe has the highest prevalence of
IV (14.8%) of all regions in Tanzania [45].
Although 25% of households have a member who  is formally
mployed, the few people who receive regular paychecks are
ostly government employees such as teachers. Some people have
emporary employment in forestry, on farms and in construction.
bout half of the households are engaged in small businesses for
xtra income throughout the year. For most entrepreneurs, there
re two seasonal cycles: the agricultural growing season and school
emesters. Every weekend there is a market, and people come from
earby villages to sell their produce. Once a month, a larger mar-
et is held in the area, attracting business people from Njombe
nd Ludewa, 2–3 h by road in the dry season. Banking services are
vailable in nearby towns but less than 10% of households have
avings accounts. In our interviews with local entrepreneurs they
xpress lack of access to investment capital to be a major problem,
s banks often charge high interest rates and demand collateral (see
lso [46], and Haselip, Desgain and Mackenzie in this issue [47]).
. Research questions
The following questions structure the analysis:
. According to what logic does the NGO implement the electri-
ﬁcation project, and what constraints have come with donor
funding?
. What strategies has the NGO used in order to achieve economic
viability and local ownership?
. What economic and organizational challenges has the local util-
ity faced? Have there been any positive consequences of local
ownership?
. What are the outcomes in terms of electricity demand and
impact on the local economy?
. MethodWe  chose this project for our case study because national-level
takeholders consider it to be highly promising and because the
roject includes extensive local participation. It hence displays
imensions seen in literature as important constraints as well as
b
o
o & Social Science 5 (2015) 20–33 23
pportunities, and the ﬁndings are therefore of interest for the
roader community of scholars and practitioners.
The analysis is based on extensive empirical work conducted by
he ﬁrst author in 2012 and 2013. After an initial one-week visit to
he project in 2012, an in-depth qualitative case study was  carried
ut in 2013. The ﬁrst author collected data during three months
n Tanzania, with about seven weeks in the villages of Madunda,
awengi, Mdete and Mapogoro, and ﬁve weeks in the nearby town
f Njombe.
She conducted three sets of semi-structured interviews, with
he help of a Tanzanian interpreter: (1) 90 interviews about the
roject (21 with project staff, 62 with villagers, and 7 interviews
nd meetings with local and district government); (2) a small qual-
tative survey on land rights, savings behavior and use of electricity
n 14 households, carried out with help of a German student; and (3)
 set of 38 interviews, plus visits and group discussions with rural
ntrepreneurs in the project area and in Njombe on the related
opic of constraints and opportunities in the local economy. These
elped us to understand the rural economy of the area and the
hallenges faced by rural businesses.
The seven weeks in the villages were spent partly with a fam-
ly, and partly renting a room from a local landlord. The stay in the
illage helped the researcher position herself as separate from the
GO staff, who  spend most of their time in the village but who
lways return to town during weekends. With the help of a villager
s a local guide, the researcher and her Tanzanian female inter-
reter walked or used local transport, independently of the project
taff. The NGO and the local utility openly shared project docu-
entation and unpublished baseline data, with the expectation of
etting feedback on the project later.
Importantly, the results and conclusions presented in this arti-
le were validated in a participatory workshop with the NGO and
he local utility in Mawengi in April 2014. The discussion was  doc-
mented and has contributed to the analysis. Project staff have
rovided the researchers with follow-up information and project
valuation reports as late as August 2014, including an update on
ew tariffs that came into effect on 1 August 2014. ACRA-CCS staff
ave read and commented on the article draft.
The analysis is structured according to a coding scheme, based
n the conceptual framework (Fig. 1, Section 2). It maps the techni-
al system, the roles of the actors involved, the relations (networks)
mong them and the institutional frameworks. Further, the analysis
races the electriﬁcation process over time, and maps measurable
nd perceived beneﬁts and drawbacks for different individuals and
roups in local communities. We  identify factors that have been
ritical for these outcomes to emerge and evaluate the degree to
hich the project has become a catalyst for socioeconomic change.
Most material has been coded using coding software, and all
nterviews have been checked for concordance and divergence
48].4 The tracing of events, information and statements has been
riangulated. Validation of results with respondents and stakehol-
ers has been crucial for credibility in interpretation and analysis.
. The Mawengi hydropower scheme: understanding
easons for outcomes of small-scale electriﬁcation4 This means that in the analysis we go through interviews and make comparisons
etween them to ﬁnd whether there are points of disagreement and contradiction,
r  whether respondents have similar views, concerns and explanations. This is part
f  the process of interpretation of data and helps assess the credibility of inference.
24 H. Ahlborg, M. Sjöstedt / Energy Research & Social Science 5 (2015) 20–33
Table  1
Summary of important program activities in the Mawengi Integrated Rural Development Program.
Year Important program activities Donors
2005 Feasibility study
Proposals for funding
The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
co-funded D 2.69 million (2005–2009)
2006–2010 Phase I:
Partnership with local church and public meetings
Construction of the hydropower plant and grid
Reforestation of river banks
November 2009: The non-proﬁt community-based utility LUMAMA is legally registered under
Tanzania’s framework for NGOs
June 2010: Plant starts operating
End of 2010: Handover of property rights of energy systems to LUMAMA
The Region of Lombardy, co-funded
D  0.89 million (2007–2009)
Private donations through Intervita
Onlus D 0.54 million (2009–2011)
2011–2014 Phase II:
November 2011: Program inauguration by the President of the Republic of Tanzania
2012–2014: construction of medium voltage and low voltage lines in upstream communities
2010–2014: Integrated development program:
Further studies: land use, risk for soil erosion, local value chain development
Natural Resource Management component:
•  Reforestation activities
• Farmer training on sustainable agriculture, forestry and livestock keeping
•  Establishment of farmer groups and pilot plots
•  Land use planning in collaboration with District Government
•  Environmental awareness campaign
Business program: Capacity training and support to 20 small and medium enterprises
School and education component
Rehabilitation of water supply systems
2012: Environmental impact assessment
2012: Installation of second turbine
2014: Shift to pre-paid meters and payment system
Private donations through Intervita
Onlus D 1.38 million (2011–2014)
The European Commission through
Ministry of Finance Tanzania,
co-funded D 1.83 million (2011–2014)
The World Bank through Rural Energy
Agency of Tanzania, funded D 0.41
million (2012–2013)
Other donors:
Ministry of Energy and Minerals
Tanzania
District Council Ludewa
S -CCS.
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c2014: (August) ACRA-CCS program exit
ource: Based on interviews, ACRA-CCS homepage and public presentation by ACRA
mplementation logic and constraints that came with donor fund-
ng. Section 6.2 addresses question 2, and so on.
.1. The logic of NGO-led rural electriﬁcation
.1.1. Project implementation logic: phase I
ACRA-CCS designed the technical system based on a feasibility
tudy in 2005. During implementation, the details of the technical
esign were decided and the system adapted to local environ-
ental conditions. There are two turbines, each with a capacity
f 150 kW.  The system is designed to work at full capacity even
uring the dry season. The work started with construction of the
ydropower plant in the Kisongo river and a distribution grid to
upply three downstream communities: the villages of Lupande,
awengi and Madunda. In the construction phase, ACRA-CCS
xpected the communities to make a substantial contribution to
he project in terms of manual labor and general help. Local govern-
ent leaders were asked to support the project and help mobilize
he people to come to meetings and carry out voluntary work in
he project.
Based on its belief in local participation as key to sustaina-
ility, ACRA-CCS wanted the hydropower plant to be owned by the
ommunities themselves. Therefore, in 2009, a community-based
tility was created under the Tanzanian legal framework for NGOs.
he utility was named LUMAMA after the initials of the three vil-
ages connected; ownership of the electricity system was  handed
ver to LUMAMA in 2010. The ﬁrst 260 customers had electricity
witched on in June 2010.
Table 1 provides a summary of program activities, from the ini-
iation in 2005, the construction in phase I (2006–2010), to the
cale-up and program ending in phase II (2011–2014).
Toward the end of the ﬁrst phase of the project, ACRA-CCS iden-
iﬁed a number of threats to the sustainability of the plant: the
onstruction was not fully completed according to plan and the
verage consumption was only around 40 kW;  LUMAMA revenues
ere not sufﬁcient to cover the costs of operation and maintenance,
i
d
t
dr of depreciation costs. There was  also low consumption of elec-
ricity for productive uses (only 30% of total energy production).
rganizationally, LUMAMA did not have enough capacity to man-
ge the service efﬁciently and independently. The project staff
xplained how some constraints arose from being an NGO, such
s the short time scale of project funding and difﬁculties with the
valuation of results. The ﬁrst project phase was  not long enough
o reach the targets set.
.1.2. Phase II: meeting the challenges by changing logic – project
xpansion and integration of components
These challenges were addressed in the second phase of the
roject. The ‘logic’ by which ACRA-CCS worked through the sec-
nd phase was  to build on what had been achieved in the ﬁrst
hase and expand it. ACRA-CCS raised new funding from multiple
onors, which made it possible to undertake a range of activities in
arallel. Thereby, the NGO could ﬁnalize planned construction and
hen expand the grid to reach more customers and communities.
t could also build local management capacity and work with com-
unities to ﬁnd solutions to challenges. The electriﬁcation scheme
xpanded to include activities in education and health, because the
GO reasoned that electricity connection for public services such as
chools and healthcare institutions would result in long-term posi-
ive impact on quality of life in the area. Other components focused
n natural resource management, agriculture, business develop-
ent and water provision. The parallel activities targeted problems
nd challenges that emerged in relation to the new system. The
GO had discovered how complex a rural electriﬁcation scheme
an be, with cross-cutting social, economic, political and techni-
al challenges. Only by working together with individual villagers,
ommunity groups and LUMAMA, as well as government author-
ties at multiple levels, could ACRA-CCS drive the project in the
esired direction. Had it not been for the activities undertaken in
he second phase, the project would likely have been another failed
evelopment project, without lasting results.
H. Ahlborg, M. Sjöstedt / Energy Research
Table  2
Characteristics of the technical system.
Turbine: Francis Turbine horizontal axis, nominal power: 168 kW
Real output: 150 kW
Rotation speed: 1500 RPM
Second turbine installed October 2012: doubling the capacity to 300 kW
Micro-grid installation 2009: 15 km of MV lines, 9 transformers, 15 km LV
network
Micro-grid expansion 2014: 39 km of MV  lines, 17 transformers, 40 km LV
network
Total at end of project: 26 transformers, 54 km MV line, 55 km LV line
Energy production:
Commissioning of plant and start of service delivery in June 2010: 260
connections
Average daily consumption June 2011: 40 kW (minimum 5 kW,  maximum
70  kW)
Incomes from electricity sales = 20% of cost for operation and maintenance
(O&M)
July 2013: total 700 connections
June 2014: total 1200 connections
Average daily consumption June 2014: 80 kW
Peak load: 200 kW
Average monthly income 2013–2014: 6 million Tanzania shillings = 92% of
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comes from the milling machines (category 4) and businesses (cate-
gory 3). The 21 milling machines are the largest loads, and consumeO&M cost
ource: Based on interviews and ACRA-CCS project documentation material.
During 2014, ACRA-CCS is phasing out, and it is now up to the
ocal utility to manage the system sustainably. At the time of the
ast visit by the ﬁrst author in April 2014, the distribution sys-
em reached 9 communities, with a total of 26 transformers. The
ustomer base had grown to 1200 paying customers (i.e. 1200 con-
ections, whereas the number of users is much higher), with an
verage load of 80 kW.  Through the project, a number of elec-
ricity services have been made available to the people in the
rea. Hydropower has the advantage of being a continuous energy
ource, making electricity services available 24/7, and very reliable
ith few unplanned blackouts. The service is also of high quality,
ith very little ﬂuctuation in frequency. The technical characteris-
ics of the system are summarized in Table 2.
.2. Economic and organizational challenges
.2.1. A strategy to ensure economic viability
There is a business plan for how to make sure the project is
conomically viable over time. ACRA-CCS has deﬁned economic
iability as managing the monthly budget and raising enough
ncome to cover costs of operation and maintenance, as well as sav-
ng for unexpected events and for the long-term depreciation cost.
n order to achieve this, the ﬁrst priority was to ﬁnalize the con-
truction and establish enough connections to reach a certain level
f income for LUMAMA from the electricity fees. In order to raise
apital for future investments, a number of tree plots for timber
roduction have been established as LUMAMA property.
In its approach to households, ACRA-CCS aims for social impact.
ince connection fees represent an important barrier for most rural
ustomers, they were requested to only cover the cost of inter-
al wiring. The typical cost of connection5 is 180,000 Tanzanian
hillings (TZS) (about 80 Euros) and this investment was made eas-
er by a credit scheme for customers, set up in the ﬁrst phase.6 As
 point of reference, the basic needs poverty line in Tanzania in
5 Representing the cost paid by a customer with 3 lights and 2 sockets for mate-
ials, administration and technical installation.
6 Initially, ACRA-CCS helped LUMAMA establish a revolving fund that supported
nvestment in internal wiring with 80%, meaning that customers only paid 20% up
ront. However, the time for repayment (1 year) did not match with the rate of new
pplicants, therefore the fund ﬁnished and LUMAMA had to delay connecting new
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011–2012 was around 36,000 TZS per adult per month [49]. This
as made it possible also for middle-income families to afford con-
ections, thereby enlarging the potential customer base. However,
any families live in houses that do not meet the minimum con-
truction standards for connection to the electricity grid. According
o the baseline undertaken by ACRA-CCS, only 16.2% of buildings in
he area are eligible for grid connection. Further, households that
ish to connect must also dig a trench for the underground cable
rom the cabin up to the house. Some families cannot manage this
ork by themselves and must hire labor, thus incurring extra cost.
At the beginning of the project, tariffs and cost of connection
ere lower than the national average in order to enhance access
or households. The focus on social beneﬁts also included free
onnection of schools and health centers, in order to improve pub-
ic services. These public institutions pay only for consumption.
he downside of the relatively low tariffs is that incomes from
ales of electricity have been low, and that LUMAMA has many
ustomers who  lack an economic buffer. In June 2011, the major-
ty of households and public institutions paid ﬂat tariffs, based
n the number of power points in the premises (2500, 3200 or
000 TZS/month). Household and public users with meters paid
 unit cost of 120 TZS/kWh. Larger consumers and workshops
ad meters and paid per unit of electricity consumed. Milling
achines paid 150 TZS/kWh and workshops and businesses paid
00 TZS/kWh.
ACRA-CCS’s initial position on the appropriate level of tariffs
as revised over time. In the second phase, NGO staff encouraged
UMAMA to increase tariffs in order to reach the economic targets
et in the business plan (based on 1400 paying customers). Cur-
ently (August 2014), LUMAMA is generating sufﬁcient income to
anage operation and maintenance. During 2014, the system with
at tariffs has been replaced by a pre-paid system with meters for
ll customers. Fig. 2 provides details of the current tariffs, as from
 August 2014.
The change from ﬂat tariffs to pre-paid meters was  motivated
y the need to simplify the administration of payments as the num-
er of customers grew. As can be seen from Fig. 2, the new tariff
ystem has ﬁve different categories of customers – depending on
he type of customer and use. Customers pay a monthly service fee
lus their own use of electricity, according to the electricity charge
or the speciﬁc category. The cost per unit (1 kWh) is 150–330 TZS
around D 0.067–0.148), which is comparable to the tariff of the
ational electric company Tanesco of 100–350 TZS per unit (kWh)
50].7 With service charges, the average monthly cost for rural cus-
omers of the national grid is somewhat higher [51].8 The LUMAMA
udget for 2014–2015 foresees an average monthly income of 11.4
illion TZS and average monthly cost of 9.6 million TZS. The yearly
urplus for 2014–2015 is expected to be 16 million TZS, partially
overing the depreciation cost of 57 million per year. LUMAMA
lans to be able to save the full amount of depreciation cost from
ear 2018.
As can be seen in Fig. 2, an important share of LUMAMA’s incomeany energy units each, generating more income for LUMAMA
ustomers who  needed credit. In order to speed up connections, the conditions of
he  fund were changed to provide 50% credit (payback over 6 months).
7 The prices are in effect from 1 January 2014 according to The Citizen.
8 Tanesco has no service charge for the smallest consumers. Customers consum-
ng above 75 kWh  per month pay a service charge of around 3800 TZS. Before the
rice increase in 2014, the ‘average cost per month paid by rural households by
ource of energy’ was, according to national statistics, on average 8926 TZS for elec-
ricity from the national grid, and the corresponding cost for electricity from diesel
enerator was 28,170 TZS in 2011.
26 H. Ahlborg, M. Sjöstedt / Energy Research & Social Science 5 (2015) 20–33
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the church partner by giving them positions on the utility board. It
can be seen as a deliberate attempt at encouraging powerful insti-
tutions to invest in the continuation of the energy system and the
survival of the local utility.Fig. 2. New tariff system of LUM
ource: LUMAMA budget 2014–2015.
han all the 600 customers in category 1 – households with the
owest consumption. These households use electricity mainly for
ighting and for charging of mobile phones, and some use much
ess than the expected average – as little as 5 kWh  per month. In
rder to stimulate productive use of electricity, ACRA-CCS estab-
ished a business program that has supported 20 local businesses
o start up new income-generating activities, including the provi-
ion of electric machines by grant (up to 4 million TZS) and training
n how to use them. Almost 30% of all customers are using elec-
ricity for business, accounting for 58% of the electricity sold. The
GO also supported local farmers within the frame of the agricul-
ural component in diversifying local agriculture and developing
he production of certain crops identiﬁed by the farmers and the
GO as having commercial potential.
The activity of milling maize was identiﬁed by ACRA-CCS as
ocially important, because almost all households in the area eat
aize ﬂour porridge, ugali, on a daily basis. In comparison to using
iesel for operating the mill, electricity from hydropower has a
ower production cost. ACRA-CCS wanted this cost saving to beneﬁt
he customers rather then the businesspeople. Therefore, the NGO
egulated the number of milling machines that could be connected
one or two per transformer) as well as the price of the service of
illing. Businesspeople who wanted to invest in an electric mill
pplied to the village chairman of the transformer, who selected
 candidate. LUMAMA and ACRA-CCS advised on the purchase of
quipment and subsidized 50% of the cost for electric installation.
he milling machine owner paid the rest of the capital investment
nd agreed to apply LUMAMA milling tariffs. As a result, the price
or milling services was halved, beneﬁtting all families in the vil-
ages and improving their cash ﬂow.
.2.2. A strategy to create local ownership
The other main priority in phase II was to build the manage-
ial and organizational capacity of LUMAMA, in order to create real
wnership and a sense of local responsibility. From the perspective
f NGO staff, the local population’s low level of education, and lack
f exposure to and knowledge about electricity made the process
arder.To strengthen LUMAMA, ACRA-CCS provided a management
xpert to work closely with the local utility and to sit in weekly
eetings with the staff. From interviews directly after the meet-
ngs, it is clear that it has been a mutual learning process. Over S (applied from 1 August 2014).
he years, problems, progress and actions have been discussed in a
ontinuous dialog between ACRA-CCS, and LUMAMA  management
nd board. The NGO also provided training, for example on manage-
ent and administration, accountancy and good governance (with
mphasis on the principles of transparency and non-corruption).
he technicians, the manager and the accountant are all villagers
ho live in the area. They have been recruited and trained, and are
ppointed by the LUMAMA board. Over time, they have developed
he skills necessary to manage the system on a daily basis.
ACRA-CCS assisted LUMAMA in developing the organizational
tructure (Fig. 3) and adapting the organization’s regulation to
ccommodate the growing number of customers. The regulation
ecures democratic decision-making, and prevents political lead-
rs from gaining positions of leadership in LUMAMA. All customers
re LUMAMA members and are perceived by the staff and board as
hareholders in the hydropower plant and distribution grid. Also,
CRA-CCS worked to ensure the support of district government andFig. 3. LUMAMA organizational structure.
ource: interviews with LUMAMA and ACRA-CCS staff and project documentation.
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As can be seen in Fig. 3, the members are organized into three
evels, electing their representatives every third year: at each trans-
ormer, at zone and on the General Assembly (GA). The GA meets a
inimum of twice a year and holds a number of powers, including
lecting the board, deciding on tariffs and changes in the regula-
ion. The GA members also discuss and approve of the yearly budget
nd thereby they gain insight into the utility’s economic situation.
he board meets with the employed staff on a regular basis and
versees the operational work and ﬁnances.
The managerial capacity of the LUMAMA staff and organiza-
ion has developed substantially during Phase II. Between 2012
nd 2013, there was a clear difference in how the staff viewed
heir own capacity and the ability for LUMAMA to manage indepen-
ently. In 2012, the manager explained: “LUMAMA cannot manage
y itself, not now, but when we have more costumers and can raise
he money we will be able to manage by ourselves.” In 2013, he
xplained in detail the skills he had acquired over the last year, and
is wish to receive further training on professional management.
However, interviews in 2013 showed that the large majority
f local people, including staff, did not think the utility could be
conomically independent. Villagers and LUMAMA members fre-
uently expressed their hopes that ACRA-CCS would continue to
rovide whatever external funding was needed in the future or
nd other donors. “[We hope that] it is possible for ACRA to write
 proposal, even for you [the researcher] to help us, to write to
eople for help to buy the material we need [and] to ﬁnd a new
onor.” They also doubted whether the local utility – that is, the
ommunities themselves – could raise enough capital for pay for
uture expansion and reinvestments. The business plan anticipates
early savings of 57 million TZS to cover the large reinvestments
hat will be required once general components need to be replaced
the expected lifetime is at least 20 years). From the villagers’
oint of view, anything could happen before then, and the scale
f investment makes it seem impossible. The chance for LUMAMA
o actually succeed is likely to increase if it has external managerial
upport and advice, even if it sustains itself economically.
.3. The future of LUMAMA – a local non-proﬁt utility
During data collection in 2013, ACRA-CCS was phasing out and
reparing to exit the project in August 2014. LUMAMA was  in
harge of the system. In order to address question 3, we  now shift
erspective to that of utility staff and members, analyzing what
hallenges the local utility has faced, and then positive conse-
uences of local ownership. The analysis reveals how economic
nd organizational aspects are intertwined.
.3.1. The relationship between LUMAMA and local communities
Today, LUMAMA is embedded in the local community but is not
et the grassroots organization it aspires to become. All staff are
ecruited locally, live in the area, and the ofﬁce is in the center
f Mawengi village. Initially, LUMAMA membership was  voluntary
nd at the time of the ﬁrst visit in 2012, few customers were mem-
ers. In 2013, membership was made compulsory for customers
nd open also to non-customers. With the new regulation and orga-
izational structure, a larger number of customers are involved in
atters relating to LUMAMA, but not all feel like they are a mean-
ngful part of the organization.
During these ﬁrst four years of service delivery, there were a
umber of frictions between the local utility and the villagers and
ocal economy. LUMAMA relies on incomes from the sale of elec-
ricity only. Because the system is off-grid, the local utility cannot
ell electricity to the national grid. Until 2014, the majority of
ustomers paid ﬂat tariffs, and all customers paid for their con-
umption at the end of the month. In this area, people have no
h
o
w
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revious experience of paying monthly bills or reading customer
ontracts. In 2013, the accountant explained that LUMAMA was
acing a challenge because many customers did not pay their bills
n time, which led to a budget deﬁcit for the utility. From the
erspective of LUMAMA, this posed an economic challenge, but
t also challenged their ability to live up to their own and ACRA-
CS’s expectations. During the ﬁrst years, the NGO was  adding
xtra funds on a monthly basis to allow LUMAMA to cover its
unning cost, but with the increasing number of customers, the
ocal utility was expected to reach a balance and then a surplus.
tility staff have taken very seriously the task of becoming an orga-
ization that can stand on its own  and successfully manage the
ydropower plant and electricity services. The ‘good governance’
thics promoted by ACRA-CCS have been taken to heart as having
he ﬁnances in order and treating all customers equally, according
o the regulation. The rules for customers are spelled out in the
ustomer contract. Initially, the contract stipulated that customers
ere to be disconnected after three months of delayed payment.
ater, LUMAMA changed the rules and reduced the time. Since July
013, customers have to pay within one month or they will ﬁrst be
arned, and then disconnected. The motivation for imposing such
trict rules was  that “the revenues [from] the bills payment are the
nes which are used to pay the salaries of the workers [LUMAMA
taff]. If somebody has not paid the bill it means the workers are not
oing to be paid” (ACRA-CCS management expert). Villagers must
dapt their behavior accordingly, or they risk being disconnected.
urther, between 2010 and 2013, tariffs were increased on multiple
ccasions, in order to reach economic viability.
These actions by LUMAMA – imposing stricter rules of payment
nd increasing the tariffs – caused discontent among villagers. In
nterviews with paying customers, most say that it is legitimate
o disconnect those who do not pay their bills, but very few felt
t justiﬁed to do so after only one month of delay. They argued
hat LUMAMA should show consideration for how poor people are.
here are multiple aspects related to poverty, and to the structure of
he local economy, that interviewed customers explain have caused
hem to not pay their bills on time, such as: (1) low incomes; (2)
easonal incomes; (3) lack of habit to pay monthly bills; (4) low
ducation, making it hard for customers to read contracts and plan
heir expenses; (5) distance and lack of transport (up to 2 h walking
istance); and (6) expectations relating to the service and the local
wnership. In the following paragraphs, we elaborate on some of
hese.
Electricity services for households are a new experience for the
illagers. Some have lived in town and are familiar with electricity,
ut for the majority, it is the ﬁrst time they are paying monthly
ills, and getting used to it has been more or less difﬁcult. As one of
he ACRA-CCS staff put it: “people in the villages have no habit of
aving money or calculating costs; for them it is not easy to adapt
o monthly payments. But the money is there.” In his view, the fact
hat customers did not pay their bills was  as much a cultural prob-
em as a lack of income. The assertion that delayed payments were
ot always due to lack of income was conﬁrmed in some interviews.
 number of families with regular incomes had been disconnected
ecause they did not realize there was  a strict deadline. And when
UMAMA introduced stricter rules for payment, they had to dis-
onnect many customers in the ﬁrst month, because people did
ot expect the rules to be enforced.
The strict regulations on payment and disconnection had a
eterrent effect on a few potential customers. An old man  explained
hat he could afford the materials and cost for the connection, but
is wife worried about being able to pay the bills: “We  are afraid
f having electricity because if you don’t pay for 3 months they
ill come and cut off your electricity”. Another man  had connected
ut now found himself without money for paying the next bill.
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distribution systems that place demands on the organization, to
regulate consumption and plan ahead for growing demand. Over-8 H. Ahlborg, M. Sjöstedt / Energy Re
his seemingly contradictory situation was due to his – and many
thers – seasonal cash ﬂow; whereas people are used to making
arger investments after harvest, they also have periods without
ny income. Most customers stated that the tariff was acceptable
nd that the cost of electricity was lower compared to the money
hat most households spend on buying kerosene, but signing up
s a customer takes away the possibility of not spending at all if
hings get really bad. The risk of becoming indebted is still there,
ven with the new payment system, as the service fee has to be paid
onthly. Here, factors such as the economic vulnerability of house-
olds, short average length of life and lack of safety nets combine
ith the system design to constrain access.
Household economic constraints and behavior cannot alone
xplain difﬁculties with making people pay for electricity. It is also
 matter of expectations coming with local ownership. LUMAMA
s not a commercial business run by an outsider, like the national
lectric company Tanesco or the mobile phone companies that peo-
le are used to. It is locally owned, and the staff and members of
he board and the GA are well known by all customers. Therefore,
illagers expect LUMAMA to behave differently than a commer-
ial investor would. Thus, there is a certain tension between being
ocally embedded and functioning as an independent professional
tility.
Two examples illustrate this tension, the ﬁrst relating to ordi-
ary people and the second to local leaders and people with higher
ocial status. In 2013, many villagers – both connected and not con-
ected to the micro-grid – expressed in interviews the opinion that
UMAMA should prioritize the beneﬁts for the community at large,
ot just cater to the richest people with businesses. They expected
o be involved, informed and asked for their opinion, and com-
lained in interviews that this was not happening. As one woman
xplained: “they don’t announce, when you go and pay the bill you
ust ﬁnd that the tariff has already increased and you have to pay
or the new contract as well. They should have told us that at the
nd of the year there will be an increase. I am not at all happy with
his”. Despite knowing the staff and the ofﬁce being nearby, a few
ustomers felt as if there was no arena for them to participate in
hat was happening. This indicates that communication between
UMAMA and the customers did not function very well during the
arly years. At this stage, the transformer groups had existed for less
han a year, and although they had started to hold meetings, the
evel of activity varied a lot between groups and not all customers
ad been to one.
The second example has to do with LUMAMA’s relation to
ocal leaders. LUMAMA staff, board and members of the GA have
aken the approach that all customers must be treated alike, and
hat powerful people should be given no special treatment. The
ossibility, coming with this particular technology, to disconnect
n individual customer, has proved a strong sanction that helps
nforce rules. Once one is disconnected, one has to pay a ﬁne of
5,000 TZS (D 10.7) to be reconnected. A number of local leaders
ho were not paying their bills have been disconnected and ﬁned.
hrough the act of disconnecting people, LUMAMA has established
ts authority and the importance of rules.
But the authority of LUMAMA is still disputed. A number of
ustomers – all of them people of high social status – perceived
he relationship between the local utility and the customers as
nbalanced. Having started by explaining the many beneﬁts of the
ew electricity service, one man  expressed his ambivalent feeling
oward the project:“It becomes difﬁcult because now we don’t even know how to
take precautions, how to run [the technology]. . . we are just
depending on other people who know it. . ..What I am seeing, it
is like, they are managers on that side and we are the people on
l & Social Science 5 (2015) 20–33
the other side. They are the ones to tell us to do this and that. But
now, if we are to share, even trying to suggest [an improvement],
I ﬁnd that it is difﬁcult.”
The way  he framed it indicated that he wanted to be on an
qual footing with LUMAMA. Also other people were uncomfort-
ble, depending on a “monopoly” for electricity. They argued that
he contract stipulated the responsibility of the customer only, and
ot that of the utility. Again, this indicates their feeling of enti-
lement, but also a critique of LUMAMA not being ‘professional’
nough. It was  also clear in interviews, that some villagers consider
he local staff members as incompetent, and they expected the local
tility to fail on its own. Being locally embedded therefore leads to
 certain degree of mistrust.
Despite the complaints, the majority of customers considered
UMAMA to be doing a good job. But there was  also a clear worry
bout what would happen once ACRA-CCS left the project: will
UMAMA be able to manage themselves? How will they be able to
ontinue without external funding? The local utility “cannot even
fford to buy a motorbike” as one villager said. How could they
ossibly manage without help?
.3.2. LUMAMA’s economic outlook
People with leadership positions in LUMAMA proposed two sets
f strategies to achieve economic viability. One set of activities
ould target the communities and provide business training for
ocal enterprises and students, promote modern agricultural prac-
ices, and assist development of local banks. These strategies aim
o diversify the local economy, reduce its seasonality and increase
eople’s incomes. It is expected to lead to a stable customer base
hat can buy electricity services throughout the year and afford
igher tariffs. The second set of strategies refers to the develop-
ent of LUMAMA. It is projected that the system will expand both
n terms of the number of customers (up to 2000) and in terms of
onsumption per customer.
Since August 2014, the system with ﬂat tariffs has been replaced
ith a new payment scheme with pre-paid meters (Fig. 2, Section
.2.1). In comparison to before, the new tariffs represent a signif-
cant increase in price per unit. However, the increased tariffs do
ot necessarily translate into higher cost for customers, as they
re likely to consume less electricity now that they have to pay
or each kWh. For the smallest users (households that consume
–10 kWh/month), it is expected that the total cost per month will
ardly increase.9 Customers will now pay up-front instead of at the
nd of the month. The change in system design to pre-paid meters
llows for domestic customers to consume more when they have
ncome.
LUMAMA also needs to plan for and cope with seasonality
f electricity demand among its business customers. For exam-
le, the owners of the milling machines have very few customers
efore harvest and the tailors get important income from making
chool uniforms at the beginning of each semester. The implica-
ion is that sales of electricity will vary over the year, increasing
he seasonality of incomes for LUMAMA. The local economy places
igher demand on organizational planning capacity in order to
dapt.
.3.3. Positive consequence of local ownership
Load management is another important issue in small-scaleoad, that is, too much current demand on the circuits in electric
9 The expected total cost will be 3250–4000 TZS per month.
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vehicles in the downstream villages has increased from just a few
motorbikes in 2012, to tens of motorbikes, a few cars and even one
truck in 2014. One of the local businessmen explained that he wasH. Ahlborg, M. Sjöstedt / Energy Re
ystems, leads to protection devices cutting off the current ﬂow,
ausing a system shut down and therefore a temporary black-
ut. In Mawengi, if the hydropower system stops due to overload,
 technician has to go to the plant and manually restart the
ystem, a process that takes a few hours. This technical con-
ition has motivated both management and users to manage
oads.
Locally embedding LUMAMA facilitates people voluntarily
greeing to manage the load. In 2013, the rains came late and the
ater table fell below what LUMAMA and ACRA-CCS thought was
he minimum needed to keep the system running at full capacity.
here was a risk of overload. In response to the reduced water ﬂow,
UMAMA called a meeting with all owners of milling machines, i.e.
he heaviest loads (largest consumers of electricity) in the system,
o decide on voluntary distribution of service hours during periods
f stress. The risk of blackout, if all machines were to run at the
ame time, proved a strong incentive for competing millers to col-
aborate and make voluntary agreements. The arrangement was
till working well six months later. The experience strengthened
UMAMA in its role as a management organization. Also, the will-
ngness to collaborate has an economic value, that is, voluntary
nd observed agreements on load shedding bring the opportunity
o maximize the use of, and thereby incomes from, the existing
apacity, allowing for more customers and higher overall loads than
ould otherwise be the case.
Another value that has been achieved as a result of local owner-
hip in this particular system is protection of the grid infrastructure
nd the ability to hold individuals responsible for damage. In 2011,
 villager felled a tree across a newly built extension line to one
f the villages, breaking the new rules for what activities could be
ndertaken close to electric lines. Whether it was  by accident or
ot, the man  refused to pay for the damage. The villagers expected
CRA-CCS to pay for the repair. But the grid was the property of
UMAMA and they had to solve it themselves. It took about six
onths before the local leaders and LUMAMA could put enough
ressure on the man  to make him pay. After that, there have been
ther cases of people felling trees over the lines, but the utility
taff have solved these together with the village leaders within a
ew weeks (damage has amounted to a total of around D 3000).
his is a valuable protection of the infrastructure and shows a
ense of responsibility rarely achieved in commercial systems.
ather than it ending up in a court case, LUMAMA and the local
uthorities are holding individuals responsible for damage to the
nfrastructure and community services, and are quickly reaching
olutions.
.4. From service delivery to impact
The ﬁnal question is what economic impact the project has
ctually had on the communities and whether the demand for elec-
ricity is increasing in a way that can provide the customer base
UMAMA needs. A quantitative assessment cannot be done, as the
aseline study carried out by ACRA-CCS was done in 2012, when
he project had already delivered services for a couple of years. Still,
he qualitative study provides some insight into what changes have
ccurred.
.4.1. Electriﬁcation as a driver for economic change
For households in the electriﬁed villages, the major economic
mpact is the 50% reduction in the cost of milling services, and, for
onnected households, the cost reduction from replacing kerosene
ith electricity for lighting [52]. Households without electricity
onsume an average of 3.5 liters of kerosene per month at a cost
o
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f 6120 TZS,10 compared with 4750 TZS for a customer consuming
5 kWh  per month. As noted earlier, the basic needs poverty line is
bout 36,000 TZS per month. Firewood (and to some degree char-
oal) remains the dominant fuel for cooking, even in households
aving electricity. For people with light at home, the survey and
nterviews suggests the majority stay up one or two hours longer
n the night, and if they have television (6.6% of households in 2012),
pending time in front of the TV. Communications have improved,
ith easy access to mobile phone charging – in 2012, 68.5% of
ouseholds owned mobile phones. “Before electricity, the difﬁculty
n charging was the factor that most discouraged people from buy-
ng a mobile phone.  . ..  [T]he issue of communication has improved
 lot”. There is a range of new services using electric appliances that
ere not there before, such as fridges, electric sewing machines,
lectric razors and photocopy machines. Some people said they
aved time and money from not having to travel to the nearby
own for these services. A handful of people also state that people
rom other villages now come to their village to use the new ser-
ices, which helps the local economy grow. Future evaluations will
eveal if the expected long-term beneﬁts from the project-related
mprovements of education and healthcare will impact positively
n local livelihoods.
In terms of businesses, the provision of electric light has led
o longer opening hours. Many business people, such as barbers,
utchers and restaurant owners, say that since the number of cus-
omers has increased after they got light, they make more money
these are likely to be local customers who went to other places
efore and now have changed their preferences). A few busi-
esspeople interviewed have been able to expand their services
nd employ more people (often one or two new assistants to the
hopkeeper). There are also new enterprises, supported by ACRA-
CS’s business program, including sunﬂower oil pressing machines,
echanical workshops, poultry farming and fruit processing. How-
ver, there are examples of carpentry owners who lay off workers
hen they get electric machinery. The statement that electriﬁ-
ation generates jobs needs to be qualiﬁed, because some jobs
isappear at the same time as new opportunities arise when the
conomy is reshaped and local cash ﬂow is redirected, and not all
ew jobs are paid better than the old ones. Unless there is an inﬂow
f resources from external sources, the size of the local economy
ay  not grow.
Lack of electricity is just one of the constraints for local busi-
esses. For example, some carpentry workshops have been able
o increase their speed of production and to some extent also the
uality of their products due to investments in electric machinery.
owever, the ﬁnal products cost the same, and they sell mainly
o the local market. Low quality of raw material results in poor
uality products (only slightly better than before) that cannot com-
ete in external markets. Poor road infrastructure, seasonality of
emand and lack of investment capital are other important barriers
o increasing productivity. In the service sector, increasing compe-
ition for customers can also become a problem. This was the case
or a woman who was among the ﬁrst to have electric light in her
mall restaurant in Mawengi. The initial boost in her business did
ot last, as other restaurant owners also put in electric lights.
A visitor returning to the area will see the visual changes of a
rowing economy. Over the past ﬁve years, the number of motor10 Whereas the price per liter of kerosene in Dar es Salaam was 2040 TZS (D 0.92)
n 3 September 2014, rural prices were substantially higher. According to a study
rom 2012, rural consumers pay 23% more for kerosene [52].
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uying a car now that there were new business opportunities in the
unﬂower oil market thanks to electricity. House constructions are
isibly on-going at multiple locations in each village, and according
o statements from a handful of villagers, people choose to build in a
lace where they can be connected to the new grid, given that they
an afford to buy land. If this is a general and sustained trend, it will
ead to denser settlement patterns in the longer term. This, in turn,
ill facilitate grid expansion by reducing distance and thereby cost
f investment. There is also evidence that some people have come
ack to the area and found themselves employment or started new
usinesses. Other people have migrated to the area because they
elt that there was an opportunity to make a living.
. Conclusions and ﬁnal discussion
The Mawengi hydropower project displays an interesting com-
ination of factors that earlier research identiﬁes as being key to
uccess as well as to the possible failure of small-scale off-grid
lectriﬁcation. It is an NGO-led and donor-funded project, and
uch development interventions are criticized as being economi-
ally unsustainable, donor-dependent, short-term and top-down
nterventions [33,38]. There are also the contextual challenges,
dentiﬁed by previous research as negatively inﬂuencing economic
iability, related to implementing this kind of project in a rel-
tively poor area of Tanzania where the demand for electricity
nd the level of industrialization is very low, and the majority of
nhabitants are farmers with seasonal spending patterns [1,9,12].
n the positive side, the case is characterized by a high level
f local involvement and capacity building – factors identiﬁed
y previous research as prerequisites for sustainable small-scale
lectriﬁcation [2]. The socio-technical system perspective and the-
retical framework have assisted us in probing and understanding
he signiﬁcance of, and interactions and tensions between, these
mportant factors in the process of system formation. We  will now
nswer and discuss each research question.
.1. The logic of integrated development
The ﬁrst question is: According to what logic does the NGO imple-
ent the electriﬁcation project, and what constraints have come with
onor funding? Our analysis of the implementation ‘logic’ included
ttention to the NGO ethics and objectives, choice of design and
ode of operation of the system, and the strategy of implemen-
ation. The case shows that speciﬁc circumstances and key actors
haped the initial logic of implementation and the system put in
lace. The good relationship between the local church and the
nternational NGO, ACRA-CCS, allowed these actors to mobilize
onor funding for the project, and use high-quality equipment. The
riorities, objectives and interests of both actors corresponded well
nd resulted in a non-proﬁt development initiative.
In the ﬁrst phase of construction, ACRA-CCS played a fairly con-
entional role for an NGO – arriving in the community with external
unding and expertise, constructing a mini-hydropower system
nd grid infrastructure according to predeﬁned design and within
 set time frame. However, the staff realized that they would not
chieve project objectives without changing the logic, from a focus
n providing infrastructure to working with the actors and insti-
utions that would guarantee system sustainability. They needed
ore time to ﬁnalize construction but also funding for other types
f activities that had not been foreseen at the initial planning stage.
his required a broader funding base. As ACRA-CCS was  successful
n acquiring funding from multiple donors for the second phase,
he staff could focus on building the organizational capacity and
nstitutional protection of the local utility LUMAMA. For example,
o
i
a
i & Social Science 5 (2015) 20–33
heir support included on-the-job training for staff, being present
t the ofﬁce on a weekly basis, joint weekly meetings and man-
gerial advice. The exit strategy of the NGO was to make sure the
tility could own and manage the energy system independently
nd achieve economic viability.
Another dimension of the change of logic had to do with staff
ncreasingly understanding the cross-sector linkages between the
actors that challenged the sustainability of the energy system.
his was addressed when ACRA-CCS launched various parallel
omponents, in order to create synergies between sectors. This
s interesting because lack of complementary investments and
ross-sector collaboration is considered a barrier to rural electriﬁ-
ation becoming a catalyst for socioeconomic development [12,53].
he Mawengi case offers a possibility to substantiate these policy
ecommendations with evidence of the actual beneﬁt of comple-
entary investments. According to ACRA-CCS staff, the ability to
ork with parallel components has transformed the project and
as had signiﬁcant positive impact on what could be achieved.
nterviews with LUMAMA staff and villagers strengthen this con-
lusion. By addressing complementary issues, ACRA-CCS gained a
arger degree of support for the project and trust of local commu-
ities. It also produced better technical and social outcomes.
.2. Strategies to achieve economic viability and local ownership
The analysis explored in more detail two  aspects of the NGO
ogic: the economic approach and the view of system ownership.
ur question was: What strategies has the NGO used in order to
chieve economic viability and local ownership?
As expected, based on the emphasis on rural poverty as a barrier
o electriﬁcation [54], we have found that there is friction between
he economic needs of LUMAMA and the structure of the local
grarian economy and livelihood base [9]. But it became clear that
easonality of the economy plays a role that is equally important
s low levels of income. Fundamentally, the challenge lies in the
eed for LUMAMA to generate enough income and manage the
udget on a monthly and yearly basis, in a rural setting where peo-
le’s incomes and spending are related to harvest and planting, as
ell as the school year. Importantly, rural economies differ in their
easonal patterns due to speciﬁc combinations local climate, state
f infrastructure, and livelihood composition. Obviously, cash ﬂow
ynamics in coastal and inland communities are likely to differ and
t may  be relevant to adapt ﬁnancial strategies and budget plans
ccordingly.
The project had a strong social orientation from the start. In
rder to make electricity affordable for more than the high-income
ouseholds, cost of connection and tariffs were subsidized and, in
he Tanzanian context, comparatively cheap. This approach ﬁnds
upport in literature, among scholars who  argue that ﬁnancial sub-
idies are needed to cover the high up-front cost of technology [5,9].
nterestingly, the NGO went one step further and used the possibil-
ty to regulate the market for, and consumer price of, the socially
mportant milling services. As a result, the villagers beneﬁtted from
 50% reduction in the price for milling their maize, which improved
ash ﬂow and purchasing power for many families. Also the strat-
gy of actively supporting the local businesses in making use of
lectricity is in line with earlier evidence on the beneﬁt of doing
o [5]. The resulting level of productive electricity use (58% of the
lectricity sold) is high in the Tanzanian context and indicates that
roviding access to machinery by grant or credit, together with
usiness training for local entrepreneurs, can speed up the devel-
pment of productive uses substantially. Together, these strategies
mproved the economic situation of villagers both in terms of
llowing for increased consumption or saving, and by facilitating
nvestments in local production. From a system perspective, the
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nitially low tariffs and credit scheme for connection facilitated the
rowth of the customer base and created popular support for the
roject, but placed a ﬁnancial burden on ACRA-CCS and LUMAMA.
ver time, the tariffs were increased to reach a balanced budget,
nd customers enjoyed less favorable conditions. But by then, the
ustomer base had been established and the local economy had
een an initial boost.
There are different possible interpretations of ‘economic viabil-
ty’ in the context of rural electriﬁcation. ACRA-CCS deﬁnes it as
overing costs of management and operation, new investment in
nfrastructure as the system expands, and long-term reinvestment
hen infrastructure components need to be repaired or replaced.
CRA-CCS believes economic independence of the utility and abil-
ty to cover future reinvestments are important in this context. In
ontrast, the churches running hydropower installations in the area
ave a different approach11 and rely on their external networks for
onations in case more expensive system components need to be
eplaced or repaired.
The approach to local ownership also changed in its logic in
hase II. The initial organizational structure did not accommodate
or the continued construction of the distribution grid and connec-
ion of new villages. It was also top-down in the sense that it lacked
 clear institutional base among its customers. In 2013, ACRA-CCS
taff framed this as a problem and the motivation for changing the
rganizational structure. The new regulation of LUMAMA created
 wide membership base that aimed to secure the engagement of
ocal communities and protection of infrastructure.
ACRA-CCS has also aimed to strengthen the local utility by
nvolving the church and district government on LUMAMA board. It
s seen as important for balancing the interests of strong actors and
nsuring strong supporting networks. Without strong support, the
taff perceived a risk that the new organization would be outma-
euvered by existing, more powerful and established actors. The
nalysis shows that the networks with actors at higher decision-
aking levels have proved valuable at numerous occasions, when
elationships with local political actors have been tense. Rather
han implementing the project as a ‘technical’ project outside the
ealm of politics (Korf 2010), the NGO has admitted to the deeply
olitical character of the intervention and used the available polit-
cal channels, from village level up to national level. ACRA-CCS has
lso complied with national legal frameworks with the result that
overnment stakeholders at district and national level consider the
roject a role model.
.3. Becoming an arena for collaboration
In our analysis of the third research question – what economic
nd organizational challenges has the local utility faced? Have there
een any positive consequences of local ownership? – we  shifted
erspective to that of LUMAMA and of the people living in the area.
In the process of building LUMAMA as an organization, social
elationships between local people have been partially trans-
ormed. Utility staff and members with leadership positions have
aken on new roles in relation to their neighbors. They have become
the people of LUMAMA”. As a local organization, LUMAMA needs
o balance satisfaction among the users against its need for incomes
nd ‘good’ customer behavior. So far, the local utility has used rules
nd the sanction of disconnecting their electricity, to teach cus-
omers to pay their bills on time. The strict enforcement of rules
s interpreted differently depending on the situation. Some local
11 We know this from visits at other hydropower installations in the area and
iscussions with the responsible church leaders. They emphasized the social respon-
ibilities of the church and had no business plans.
7
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eaders who did not pay their bills on time complied with the rules
nly after LUMAMA used the sanction of disconnection. This may
e part of the reason why a majority of villagers in our study con-
ider LUMAMA to be non-corrupt and doing a good job. However,
isconnecting a poor family is not considered equally legitimate.
his indicates that effective regulation based on an all customers
like principle is not necessarily perceived as fair. Our analysis has
dentiﬁed six reasons why  ordinary people do not pay their bills on
ime (Section 6.3.1). The act of disconnecting customers has, under
ertain circumstances, reﬂected negatively on LUMAMA. There are
lso elements of shame and fear related to being disconnected,
s shown by previous research [55], which deter some potential
ustomers from connecting to the grid.
We  consider community ownership and responsibility to be
mportant factors that have contributed to the positive outcomes.
n particular, LUMAMA is doing well because of the broad member-
hip base, the competence of the staff and the regulatory protection
gainst elite capture. The local utility has developed into a demo-
ratic organization with decision-making power and an arena for
ommunity collaboration and problem solving. In parallel to the
ormal regulations there are emerging informal institutions in
erms of shared norms and values among members of the LUMAMA
A and board. For example, we  interpret the decisions made by the
A to raise tariffs on multiple occasions to express: ﬁrst, a shared
or at least dominant) understanding that electricity services are
aluable to the communities; second, an idea of what constitutes
esponsible action; and third, support for the principle that eco-
omic viability is a prioritized goal. However, interviews indicate a
ack of communication with villagers who are not directly involved
n the organization. Also, some villagers question the competence
f LUMAMA staff, on the basis of them being local, ‘uneducated’
eople. Therefore, a drawback with local ownership has been a
ertain degree of mistrust between villagers and LUMAMA, which
eﬂects ideas about who  is an expert and what knowledge is
alued12 [56].
Local ownership has combined with technological factors to cre-
te positive synergies. Here, we  want to highlight the important
ole played by the technology in creating positive incentives. Small-
cale hydropower comes with particular technical characteristics
nd modes of operation, which place demands on management.
hese demands have reinforced the process of organizational
evelopment. The need to manage peak loads, avoid blackouts and
ave security regulations to prevent accidents all call for collabo-
ation across village boundaries and enforcement of rules. In the
rocess, trust is strengthened and mutual learning takes place.
emands of the technology combine with the institutional frame-
orks and good relationships to local and external actors, resulting
n values for the utility that are often missing in other small-scale
lectriﬁcation processes. In particular, the voluntary and respected
greements on load management, and protection of the grid infra-
tructure against damage by individuals are important economic
nd social values for the utility. Is it possible to replicate these
lements in other off-grid systems? Could it also be done in a
ommercially run system? We  have not seen this elsewhere in Tan-
ania, but argue that there are lessons to be learnt here from how
ystem characteristics can provide incentives for individuals and
ollectives to develop a common agenda for the system.
.4. Signiﬁcant economic developmentOur fourth research question was: What are the outcomes in
erms of electricity demand and impact on the local economy? Our
12 For an in-depth discussion on expertise in relation to formal education see [49].
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nalysis has shown that the Mawengi Integrated Rural Devel-
pment Program is having substantial impact on daily life and
conomy in the communities connected to the electric grid. Can
his really be true, considering that the number of households con-
ected is just a small percentage of all households in the area? The
ost saving from cheaper milling of the staple food, maize, improves
he cash ﬂow for nearly all families in the area. Further, both public
nd commercial services have been improved, bringing immediate
nd long-term beneﬁts for the population. We  are not saying that
uture beneﬁts are guaranteed or that there are only positive con-
equences. Clearly, the analysis shows the economic complexities
nd ambiguous outcomes as well. All people interviewed agree that
lectricity – they thought it a dream and never expected it to come
rue – has brought important changes. The customer base is still
rowing. Theoretically, our analysis shows how the introduction of
lectricity and accompanying investments and opportunities are
aving a material impact on daily life.
People say that their ‘remote’ villages are developing fast. How-
ver, it is very difﬁcult to say which changes are due to having
lectricity in the village, in itself, and which are part of on-going
hanges in the rural economy that would have occurred also with-
ut the project. What change would have happened due to the
hange in administrative status of the nearby town Njombe, from
own to region, which is bringing new investments in terms of
oads and communication? We  argue that the exercise of ‘attri-
ution’ misses the point. Based on our theoretical perspective, we
rgue that the introduction of electricity and all the other activities
ndertaken by ACRA-CCS enhance and merge with processes that
re already taking place at various levels.
.5. Final reﬂections
In conclusion, the ﬁndings from this study corroborate many
f the claims in the existing literature. The case of Mawengi lends
upport to other case studies and comparisons holding factors such
s community ownership, capacity development, and stakeholder
ngagement as crucial success factors [8,9]. In addition, the case
tudy shows the importance of coupling energy programs with
omplementary activities such as, for example, education and agri-
ultural processing [5,12]. The rich case description contributes
o existing literature by ﬁlling these rather vague concepts with
oncrete content. The conceptualization of the electriﬁcation pro-
ess as the formation of a new socio-technical system has assisted
he explorative analysis as well as provided explanatory power, by
irecting our attention to the way relationships develop between
he new and previously existing technologies, actors, resources and
nstitutions and how these co-evolve over time – thereby trans-
orming the context as well as the socio-technical system.
Further, many of the economic, political, and social challenges
hat previous studies have identiﬁed as constraints – such as aid
ependency, lack of local managerial capacity, risk of elite capture,
ow electricity demand and business skills – are clearly visible in
awengi as well. The main lesson learned from this study, how-
ver, is that many of these challenges can be overcome by: having
 long time frame, acknowledging the challenges, and having the
esources to restructure the program accordingly [4]. In terms of
ost, the project has been expensive. Total cost amounts to about
 6 million, for a system of 300 kW capacity. Off-grid electriﬁcation
f poorer areas requires public investment or donor funds; return
n investments is not an option unless the system can sell excess
lectricity to a large customer – preferably the national grid. But
he Mawengi case shows that even off-grid systems can become
conomically viable in terms of covering the cost of operation and
aintenance after a few years. & Social Science 5 (2015) 20–33
It is our conclusion that the positive synergies between fac-
ors should be actively sought in other projects. In particular, the
ncentives and associated values that emerged out of the combina-
ion of local ownership, integrated development and technological
equirements are also of interest in more commercial projects. Also,
roponents of commercial, for-proﬁt, rural electriﬁcation will ﬁnd
t worthwhile to consider partnerships or hybrid models that com-
ine commercial and public ﬁnancing and establish partnerships
etween private investors, local communities and the government.
n fact, what it suggests goes beyond the idea of so-called public pri-
ate partnerships (PPPs) to public private community partnerships
PPCPs) – involving communities as crucial partners with a strong
andate and shared ownership.
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